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Huls and Ramey: Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems

Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems
European Court of
Human Rights
In 1959, the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (Convention)
established the European Court of Human
Rights (Court). The Court enforces the
obligations entered into by the Council
of Europe’s Contracting States. Any
Contracting State or individual may allege
violations of the Convention by filing a
complaint with the Court.

Landmark Ruling Strikes
Down Compulsory Religious
Classes in Turkey
The tension between Turkey’s secularism and hopes of joining the European
Union came to a head in the Court in early
October 2007. In a case involving compulsory religious lessons at school, a Turkish
parent argued that his right to freedom of
religion allowed him to prevent his daughter from attending those lessons.
Eylem Zengin, the student in the case,
and her father are Alevi, an Islamic sect
related to the Shi’ia branch of Islam. At
least ten percent of Turks are Alevi, but
Turks in general are predominantly Sunni.
The Zengins, along with other Alevis,
protest against the compulsory religious
classes because the classes focus on Sunni
beliefs and fail to recognize Alevism. The
Turkish Ministry of Education, on the
other hand, states that “the mentality of the
new school books is quite different,” and
that the religious education syllabus mentions Alevism. A teacher familiar with the
new syllabus says that changes in the syllabus do not have a significant effect on the
content of the religious lessons, however,
because “most of the teachers are conservative Sunni Muslims who see themselves more as missionaries than teachers.”
The Ministry of Education could monitor
teachers, but the Ministry members are
also Sunni and, thus, may be unlikely to
prevent teachers from focusing solely on
Sunni teachings.

The Court ruled on October 9, 2007 that
Turkey’s insistence that Ms. Zengin attend
compulsory religious classes violated
Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the Convention,
which requires the government to “respect
the right of parents to ensure… education
in conformity with their own religious …
convictions.” Parents, therefore, have the
right to religious freedom, and the Turkish
government must respect that right by not
forcing students to attend religious education classes.
Alevi groups herald the decision as
monumental in their 20-year struggle for
religious freedom. Ms. Zengin’s lawyer,
Kazim Genc, also applauds the decision,
saying that the decision solves the recent
debate about the justice of compulsory
religious education, and the continuance of
such education in a new liberal constitution. Genc believes the Court’s ruling affirmatively requires that the new constitution
not include compulsory religious lessons.
The government’s current support of compulsory religious education stands in stark
contrast to Turkey’s increasing secularism,
as highlighted by Turkey’s controversial
ban on the wearing of the hijab in schools
and the workplace. Therefore, the elimination of compulsory religious lessons seems
logical to bring education into conformity
with the other more secular aspects of
Turkish society.

Pilot Judgment Procedure
Successful in Polish Bug
River Cases
The Grand Chamber of the Court delivered a judgment in Broniowski v. Poland
on June 22, 2004. This decision marked
the first time the Court used the pilot judgment procedure — a method for the Court
to deal once with a systemic problem
raised in numerous cases, thus allowing
the Court to manage its increasing caseload more effectively. Human rights activists and non-governmental organizations
also applaud the pilot judgment procedure
as a method for introducing class action
cases to the Court. On December 4, 2007,
the Court decided that Poland met the
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requirements set forth in the pilot judgment. It thus dismissed remaining cases
with claims based upon the same violation
raised in Broniowski v. Poland.
Browniowski v. Poland was one of
several of the so-called Bug River Cases,
involving Poland’s failure to satisfy the
claims of persons who had been living in
the Eastern provinces of pre-World War II
Poland and had to repatriate to Poland after
the redrawing of Poland’s eastern border
along the Bug River at the end of the war.
A 1946 Polish law entitled repatriated persons to compensation in kind for their lost
property. They had the right to buy land
from the state and have the value of the
abandoned property offset either against
the fee for the “perpetual use” of this land,
or against the price of the compensatory
property or land. The Local Government
Act of May 10, 1990 reduced the pool of
government property available to the Bug
River claimants, however, which meant the
Polish treasury could not fulfill its obligation to meet compensation claims. The
Law of 12 December 2003, which entered
into force on January 30, 2004, discharged
Poland’s obligations towards all Bug River
claimants who had obtained any compensatory property under the previous legislation at any point, even if this compensatory
property did not fully compensate them for
their lost property.
The Grand Chamber of the Court ruled
against Poland on June 22, 2004, holding
that Poland had to take steps to ensure
proper compensation of Bug River claimants. The Court also found that Poland
violated Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the
Convention, which guarantees the protection of property. In response to the Court’s
judgment, Poland passed a new law in
2005 that set the ceiling for compensation
for Bug River property at 20 percent of
the property’s original value. This law was
based on the friendly settlement reached
between Broniowski — one of the repatriated persons — and Poland, which provided Broniowski with a lump sum of 20
percent of his claim. In furtherance of the
law, the Ministry for the State Treasury

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 9
transmitted documents to the National
Economy Bank enabling payment of compensation to 1,730 people. On December
4, 2007, the Court decided that Poland’s
new law and compensation scheme is
effective in practice, and that the law provides adequate domestic compensation.
Accordingly, under the pilot judgment
procedure, the Court struck out 40 pending
Polish cases, and is likely to strike out the
remaining 230 cases in early 2008.

French Denial of Baby’s
Return to Birth Mother
Not a Violation
Irish national Karen Kearns gave birth
in France to a daughter from an extramarital relationship, registered her daughter’s
birth anonymously, and gave her daughter
up for adoption. French law allows for
anonymous registration of a birth, and
stipulates that a birth mother has two
months to change her mind and request
the return of her child. Kearns, however,
did not request the return of her daughter
until five months after her daughter’s birth.
French social services refused Kearns’s
request for return of her child, and, after
the French Court of Cassation also ruled
against Kearns, she brought the case to the
Court.
Kearns’s primary complaints were
based on the brevity of the two-month
period in which she could request the
return of her child and the failure of French
social services to provide her with sufficient linguistic assistance to understand all
the implications of anonymously registering the birth of her child. She argued that
these circumstances violated Article 8 of
the Convention, the right to respect for private and family life. The Court found for
France in both issues. Council of Europe
Member States have not reached a consensus regarding adoption and the time limit
for withdrawing consent. Therefore, the
Court said greater latitude had to be given
to a state in striking a balance between
competing public and private interests.
Most important among those interests —
including those of the biological mother,
the adoptive family, and the public — were
the child’s best interests. France argued
that child welfare professionals determined
that it was in the child’s interests to enjoy
stable emotional relations with a new family as soon as possible. In response, the

Court decided that the two-month limit
was reasonable.
On the issue of the lack of information and linguistic assistance provided to
Kearns, the Court declared that Kearns
had received adequate information. Kearns
had chosen to come to France to take
advantage of the possibility of anonymous
registration of the birth, which was not
available in Ireland. Kearns had also visited the maternity ward before the birth
with her lawyer, and had had two lengthy
interviews with social services in the presence of interpreters. The Court determined
Kearns understood the implications of her
decision because French social services
had taken all the steps necessary to ensure
that Kearns understood the implications of
her actions.
Based on this reasoning, the Court
decided unanimously on January 10, 2008
that there was no violation of Article 8 of
the Convention. The Court decided that a
child’s best interests, particularly the interests in a stable family life, are more important than a biological mother’s right to
her child. The Court’s decision, however,
does seem to imply that the case could
have been decided differently, or decided
by employing different reasoning, if there
had been consensus among the Council of
Europe Member States concerning adoption and appropriate time limits for withdrawing consent.

Inter-American System
The Inter-American Human Rights
System was created with the Adoption of
the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man in 1948. In 1959, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights
was established as an independent organ
of the Organization of American States.
In the 1969, the American Convention
on Human Rights (the Convention) was
adopted. This Convention further defined
the role of the Commission and created the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(the Court). The Commission may recommend cases to the Court, which determines
liability under relevant regional treaties and
agreements, including the Convention.
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Mandatory Death Penalty
Violation of Rights to Life
and Fair Trial
In Boyce et al. v. Barbados the Court
addressed whether a mandatory death
penalty for persons convicted of murder contravenes rights protected in the
Convention. On November 20, 2007, the
Court held that Barbados violated Article 4
of the Convention, which protects the right
to life, when it sentenced Lennox Ricardo
Boyce, Jeffrey Joseph, Frederick Benjamin
Atkins, and Michael McDonald Huggins
(the accused) to death in accordance with
Section 2 of Barbados’s Offences Against
the Person Act of 1868. The Court also
found that the Barbadian Constitution,
which does not allow for judicial reform
of laws that existed before independence,
violates Article 2, requiring States Parties
to adopt measures to give effect to the
rights protected by the Convention, in relation to Articles 4 and 8.1, which relate to
fair trial rights.
The state argued that the mandatory
death penalty does not violate Article 4 of
the Convention for several reasons. First,
the punishment is mandated by Barbadian
law; second, each accused is judged individually, in accordance with due process
requirements; and third, individual circumstances are taken into consideration by the
Barbados Privy Council, a branch of the
executive, when deciding whether or not to
commute a death sentence.
The Court held that the mandatory
death penalty violates the protection
against arbitrary execution enshrined in
Article 4.1 by not allowing consideration
of the individual circumstances of each
case, such as the degree of culpability
of the accused. Furthermore, the Court
found that due process requirements are
not upheld in determining the appropriate
punishment if the accused is convicted, but
only in determining the guilt or innocence
of the accused.
The Court held that the judiciary should
have the power to decide whether to apply
the death penalty. The Court distinguished
between the right to have a “competent
court” determine whether the death penalty
is the appropriate sentence under Article
4.2 and the right to “apply for amnesty,
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pardon, or commutation of sentence” under
Article 4.6.
The state argued that it did not violate
the Convention since the death penalty had
not been carried out, would not be carried
out against three of the accused, and was
unlikely to be carried out against a fourth
accused. The Court found, however, that
Articles 4.1 and 4.2 were violated from
the moment the accused were sentenced
to death.
The “savings clause” of Section 26 of
the Barbadian Constitution takes away
courts’ power to review the constitutionality of laws existing before the country
became independent. The state argued that
Section 26 is not inherently a violation of
Article 2 of the Convention — the duty to
bring domestic legislation into compliance
with the Convention — as it does not prevent Parliament from amending, repealing,
or substituting existing laws.
The Court held that by preventing
judicial scrutiny over Section 2 of the
Offences Against the Person Act, the “savings clause” violates the right not to be
arbitrarily deprived of life, as protected
in Article 4. The Judicial Committee of
the Barbadian Privy Council, in its deliberation, stated that, “[W]ere it not for the
savings clause, [we] would have declared
the mandatory death penalty contrary to
the constitutional right not to be subjected
to cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.” The Court concluded that Section
26 violates Article 2 of the Convention
as it does not allow for the modification
of domestic laws to protect the rights
enshrined in the Convention.

Detention Procedures and
Control of Property Pending
Trial Deemed Violations
of Convention
On November 21, 2007 the Court held
that the Republic of Ecuador violated the
Convention’s Articles 7 and 21, protecting
personal liberty and property, respectively,
in relation to the detention of Chaparro
Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez. The Court also
found that the controversy surrounding
Articles 2 (requiring States Parties to give
effect to the Convention’s protections);
5 (providing for a right to humane treatment); 8 (protecting fair trial rights); and

25 (providing a right to judicial protection)
ceased when the state recognized their
violation.
On November 14, 1997 the Ecuadorian
anti-narcotic police impounded a shipment of fish in Guayaquil destined for
Miami. The police detected cocaine and
heroin chlorohydrate in the ship’s iceboxes. Expert testimony suggested that the
drugs were put into the iceboxes during
the manufacturing process. Chaparro was
the owner of Aislantes Plumavit Compañía
Ltd., a company that manufactured iceboxes similar to those impounded. Police
arrested Chapparo along with Lapo, the
factory manager.
The Court found several Article 7 violations relating to the suspects’ initial
detention. First, the Court held that Lapo’s
detention violated Article 7.2 because the
judge did not issue a warrant for his arrest
until after he was detained. Second, the
Court found a violation of Articles 7.2
and 7.4 when the state failed to prove that
Chaparro was notified of the reasons for
his detention. Third, the Court held that the
state violated Articles 7.2 and 7.5 by not
bringing Chaparro before a judge within
48 hours, where he could argue against the
necessity of his detention, as mandated by
Ecuador’s penal code.
The Court stated that a suspect can
only be detained pending a trial verdict
in three situations. First, a suspect can be
detained once an initial investigation has
led to a reasonable suspicion that the suspect indeed committed the crime. Second,
detention is permitted to ensure that the
suspect does not impede the investigation.
Finally, detention is allowed to prevent
the suspect from fleeing. The Court found
that Chaparro and Lapo’s detention was
arbitrary and, therefore, in violation of
Article 7.3 because the police had no cause
to reasonably suspect they had committed
the crime, and the judge authorized their
detention before the results of the investigation became available. Additionally,
neither the second nor third justifications
of detention applied.
In relation to Article 21, the Court held
that Ecuadorian law did not violate the
Convention per se, because the law only
permitted a deprivation of property in
limited circumstances. Under Ecuadorian
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law, deprivation of property is only permitted to avoid goods being used in illicit
acts; to procure the success of the criminal
investigation; to guarantee funds to cover
any eventual verdict; or to avoid loss or
deterioration of evidence.
The Court found that the method of carrying out the law became arbitrary when the
judge refused to evaluate evidence about
whether Aislantes Plumavit Compañía Ltd.
was involved and whether its goods should
remain impounded. Furthermore, the Court
held that the state violated Article 21
because there was no clear link between the
goods impounded and the crime. The Court
also held that the state violated Article 21
because it was disproportionate to require
the suspects, once acquitted, to pay for the
costs of impounding their goods.

Balance Struck between
Indigenous Right to Land Title
and State Development Needs
The Court decided the case of the
Saramaka People v. Suriname on November
28, 2007. It held that the Republic of
Suriname violated Articles 2 (requiring
States Parties to ensure effective protection of the Convention’s provisions); 3
(providing a right to juridical personality);
21 (protecting property rights); and 25
(providing a right to judicial protection)
of the Convention by not recognizing and
protecting the communal property rights
of the Saramaka people. The Court found
that the Saramaka people constitute a tribal
community because they have social, cultural, and economic traditions different
from the national community, because
they identify themselves with their ancestral territories, and because they regulate
themselves according to their own norms,
customs, and traditions.
Suriname has an obligation to enact measures aimed at guaranteeing the Saramaka
people’s physical and cultural survival
under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights. The Court found that Suriname has
a duty to protect the Saramaka people’s
property title because land is not only a
source of subsistence for them but also of
spiritual and cultural identity. By failing
to recognize the Saramaka as a juridical
personality, the state prevents them from
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being eligible to receive communal title to
their land. The Court held that in addition
to the state-granted privilege of using their
land, the Saramaka people have a right to
the land’s title.
Suriname currently allows timber and
gold-mining activity on the Saramaka people’s land. While acknowledging that the
Saramaka have a right to prevent the state
or third parties from appropriating their
resources, the Court found that the state
may restrict the enjoyment of this right if
the restrictions are previously established
by law, necessary, proportional, and aimed
at “achieving a legitimate objective in a
democratic society.” The Court instructed
the state that it must consult in good faith
with the Saramaka people when granting
permits for exploration and development.

In addition, the state must share the benefits of its activities with the Saramaka
people. Furthermore, the state must ensure
that independent and competent environmental and social impact assessments
are conducted. In granting timber and
gold-mining concessions, the state did not
undertake any of these three actions and,
thus, violated Article 21.
HRB
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